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I.

INTRODUCTION
For the purposes 0f

this

Respondent as the “City.” The

V01

I,

pp 45

-

Reply, Appellants will be referred t0 as “Petitioners” and the

District Court’s Decision

and Order, entered on July

12,

2019

(R.

60) and granting the City’s Motion t0 Dismiss, will be referred to in this brief as

the “First Decision.”

The

District Court’s

Amend and Alter Judgment
t0 herein as the

(R.

Memorandum

V01 Ipp 97

-

106

),

Decision and Order Denying Motion t0

entered 0n October 18, 2019, Will be referred

“Second Decision.”

II.

SUMMARY OF REPLY
The proceedings
of this appeal

is

in the District

Court below and

the proper interpretation 0f

148 Idaho 299, 222 P.3d 467 (2009) and

Kong Corp, 94

its

now on

appeal

make

clear that the crux

Urban Renewal Agency 0f City ofRexburg
predecessor, Boise Redevelopment

v.

Agency

v.

Hart,
Yick

Idaho 876, 882, 499 P.2d 575, 581 (1972). Petitioners contend that the District

Court misinterpreted and conﬂated the holding in Hart, Which appertained t0 urban renewal
agencies,

by misapplying

application

is

that ruling to sub-divisions

state,

such as municipalities.

erroneous because, unlike urban renewal agencies, sub-divisions of the

as the City, are Within the

Kong, 94 Idaho
is

of the

at

purview of Article VIII, Section

882-883, 499 P.2d

at

581-582).

3

0f the Idaho Constitution.

violated Article VIII, Section 3 0f the Idaho Constitution

liability

When

it

1

(Yick

is

Whether the City

undertook an obligation and

by promulgating a binding ordinance pursuant

APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF, PAGE

such

Clariﬁcation 0f the Hart holding in this case

a prerequisite t0 addressing the primary issue in the instant case, Which

thereby created a

state,

That

to

Idaho Code §§ 50-

2904 — 50-2906,
t0

t0 provide a long-term

revenue stream Via revenue allocation ﬁnancing (“TIF”)

an urban renewal agency in amounts exceeding the municipality’s annual revenue, without the

0f the qualiﬁed

requisite approval

While claiming
essentially

1.

makes

to stand

electors.

0n the two Decisions 0f the

District

Court below, the City’s brief

three arguments:

The City claims

that the District

Court dismissed

a traditional standing analysis set forth in Miles

this case for lack
v.

0f standing under

Idaho Power Co.,l 16 Idaho 635,

778 P.2d 757 (1989), and did so Without ruling 0n the merits. (City’s

Brief,

pp

Yet, the City illogically claims that the District Court’s holding that standing
available t0 Petitioners under

372 (2008)

is

Koch

et al.

v,

Canyon County, 145 Idaho

1-2).

not

is

158, 177 P.

3d

not a ruling 0n the merits, even though the City admits that said holding

was based 0n

the District Court’s interpretation 0f the decision in

Hart regarding

Petitioners’ constitutional claims. (City’s Brief, p. 5.)

2.

Based 0n the

District

Court’s interpretation of Hart, the City claims that tax

increment ﬁnancing (“TIF”) does not create a continuing obligation 0n the part 0f the
City under Article VIII Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution, (a) because the terms

“any indebtedness 0r

synonymous With an
Capital City
(c)

liability”

in

Article

VIII

obligation,” (b) because the

Section 3

“are not necessarily

TIF funds are paid

directly to

Development Corporation (“CCDC”) by the County, not the

City,

and

because the City has “...has simply foregone property tax revenues exceeding

those attributable to the set base value in the TIF district.”
Petitioners stand

meaning

as

0n

their position that the use

used in the context 0f

this

(City’s Brief, p. 6).

0f the word “obligation” in

case

is

its

synonymous with meaning 0f

indebtedness set forth in Article VIII Section 3 0f the Idaho Constitution and

kind that creates a

liability

deﬁned and explained

Idaho 32, 129 P. 643, 129 P. 643 (1912) and

APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF, PAGE 2

normal

is

0f the

’

in Feil
its

v.

City

progeny.

ofCoeur d Alene, 23
Petitioners aver that

payment of the TIF proceeds by the County
Whereas

statute,

the

TIF

if the

stop that

t0

a

mere

ministerial act

commanded by

0f the City in promulgating the ordinance legally authorizing

act

that institutes

income stream

CCDC

it is

is

and creates the indebtedness — the obligation

to supply the

CCDC for 20 years — which creates a liability 0f the City in favor 0f

City by

income ﬂow.

by amendment 0f the ordinance) were ever

acts (such as

its

For the City

t0

claim that

it

to

has simply “foregone” the TIF

portion of the property tax revenues erroneously ignores the critical fact that said

revenues have been legally pledged Via the ordinance t0 the

3.

The City claims

there

is

n0

liability created

on the part 0f the City

ﬁnance the CCDC’S subject Urban Renewal Plans
District Court’s interpretation

of

this Court’s

Petitioners contend that the District Court

ruling in

CCDC.

for

in agreeing to

20 years based, again, 0n the

holding in Hart.

As

below and the City have misinterpreted the

Hart by conﬂating the law applicable

to

urban renewal agencies With those

applicable t0 legal subdivisions 0f the state, such as cities, counties, etc.
error, there

stated above,

can be no question that the City incurred a

liability

Beyond

that

under the Feil

deﬁnition 0f “Liability.”

III.

ARGUMENT
ORDER T0 RULE 0N STANDING UNDER THE REQUIREMENTS 0F KOCH, THE DISTRICT
COURT WAS REQUIRED T0 RULE 0N THE MERITS 0F PETITIONERS’ CONSTITUTIONAL

IN

CLAIM THAT THE CITY VIOLATED ARTICLE VIII SECTION 3 BY PROVIDING TIF T0

CCDC

FOR THE SUBJECT PLANS FOR A PERIOD

IN EXCESS

0F THE CITY’S ANNUAL

REVENUE WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING THE APPROVAL 0F TWO-THIRDS

(2/3)

0F THE

QUALIFIED ELECTORS.

The City claims
to the holding in

that the District

Thomson

v.

Court dismissed

this case for lack

0f standing pursuant

City ofLewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P.3d 488 (2002), under a

traditional standing analysis set forth in

APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF, PAGE

3

Miles

v.

Idaho Power Co.,l 16 Idaho 635, 778 P.2d 757

(1989) Without ruling 0n the merits (City’s Brief, pp 1-2). The City’s claim

argument

misleading.

is

It is

erroneous in that

it

is

erroneous and

its

alleges that the District Court dismissed the

Petitioners’ complaint 011 the traditional standing analysis

under Thomson Without reaching a

decision on the merits while considering Petitioners’ constitutional claim of standing pursuant t0
the holding in Koch. In this regard,

Koch

held as follows:

Even though standing is jurisdictional and may be raised at any time, including 0n
appeal, Beach Lateral Water Users Ass'n v. Harrison, 142 Idaho 600, 130 P.3d
1138 (2006),

this

Court has never questioned the standing 0f a taxpayer to

Challenge expenditures that allegedly Violate Article VIII, §
If this

3.

Court were t0 hold that taxpayers d0 not have standing t0 challenge the

incurring 0f indebtedness or liability in Violation 0f that speciﬁc constitutional
provision,

we would,

Koch, 145 Idaho

at 162;

The fundamental
the basis 0f

Thomson

Petitioners that the

standing under

in essence,

be deleting that provision from the Constitution.

177 P.3d

at

376

error in the City’s allegation that

is

that standing

under Koch

is

its

motion

t0 dismiss

was granted on

conferred upon the allegation by the

TIF expenditures authorized by the City Violate Article VIII Section

Koch

is

3.

Thus,

conferred up making the requisite constitutional allegation and

is

distinguished from traditional standing rules governing the status of taxpayers at large applied in

The City does not deny

Thomson.

that Petitioners

Violation; in fact, the City admits the

Thomson

is

same (City

have alleged the requisite constitutional

Brief,

irrelevant to the necessary factual basis that

under Koch, for the reason that the

plaintiffs

in

pp

4-5).

Moreover, the holding in

must be alleged

for a claim of standing

Thomson made n0

constitutional claims

whatsoever — their claims were solely statutorily based on allegations arising out 0f provisions 0f
Idaho Code § 50-2027.

APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF, PAGE 4

was based

Nevertheless, the City misleadingly infers that the dismissal

Thomson, and that the

CCDC

was

District Court’s “further”

dicta as t0 the issue of standing,

merits were never considered

The

district court

by the

District

ﬁnding

that the City’s

solely

commitment 0f TIF

0n

t0 the

and therefore the dismissal was complete and the

Court with respect t0 the dismissal:

dismissed this action With a ﬁnding that Appellants lacked

000054), but went further in holding that Boise City’s
(R.,
commitment t0 allocate “revenue allocation ﬁnancing,” also known as “tax
standing

p.

increment ﬁnancing” (“TIF”), t0 the

CCDC for twenty years in the

and the Gateway Plan did not Violate Article VIII,
(R., pp. 000056—000058.)

§ 3

Shoreline Plan

0f the Idaho Constitution.

***

The lack 0f standing is adequate reason for dismissal in and 0f itself and could
have been the end of the inquiry. But the ﬁnding 0f n0 Violation 0f Article VIII, §
3 of the Idaho Constitution should also be afﬁrmed and is discussed in the
subsequent sections 0f this

brief.

City’s Brief, p.2

The

City’s above citation 0f the

Record

at

page 000054

erroneous and misleading for

is

the proposition that the District Court found that Petitioners lacked standing and dismissed this

case prior to consideration 0f the merits.
“.
.

.the Plaintiffs

The Court’s ﬁnding

d0 not have standing under Thomson

at R., p.

000054 was only

t0 bring their claims,”

that

which was

arguendo, since the Petitioners never claimed standing under Thomson.

Yet
standing

in contradiction to

analysis

under

its

assertion that the standing

Thomson without consideration

constitutional claims, the City admitted in

The reason

that

was determined under

Koch

is

of the

0f Petitioners’

page 5 0f its Brief that:

not applicable to the instant case

incur any “indebtedness 0r liability” t0 bring

it

is

that Boise City did not

within the purview of Article VIII,

§ 3 of the Idaho Constitution. This was the ﬁnding 0f the
000056-000057, 000102-000103). ..

APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF, PAGE 5

merits

traditional

district court (R., pp.

The

City’s reference t0 the

analysis in both 0f

its

Record

in the

above quote encapsulates the District Court’s

two Decisions below regarding the application 0f the decision

the merits of the instant case,

discussed herein below.

which analysis

Therefore,

Petitioners’ constitutional claims

Petitioners respectfully aver

was only

it

by the

after consideration

District Court that

it

is

in

Hart

t0

erroneous, as

and denial of the

m

0f

found that standing under Koch was

not available t0 Petitioners and that they were required to meet the traditional standing

requirements as enunciated in Thomson.

THE FINDINGS AND HOLDING 0F THE TWO DECISIONS 0F DISTRICT COURT (R., PP.
000056-000057, 000102-000103), THAT BOISE CITY DID NOT INCUR ANY
“INDEBTEDNESS 0R LIABILITY” T0 BRING IT WITHIN THE PURVIEW 0F ARTICLE VIII,
SECTION 3 0F THE IDAHO CONSTITUTION ARE IN EACH INSTANCE BASED 0N A
DETERMINATIVE MISINTERPRETATION 0F THE HOLDING IN HART.

In Argument, Section

continuing obligation to the
Constitution

by promulgating

B

0f

Brief (pp 5-6), the City claims that

its

CCDC

in Violation

the subject ordinances pursuant t0 Idaho

obligation.”

cites

liability,’

The City references

no cases

in support

Code

TIF?.'

An

.did not create a

§

50-2906.” Later

of the Idaho Constitution speaks 0f

speciﬁc terms that are not necessarily synonymous with an
the District Court’s First Decision (R., pp. 000056-000057), but

of its contentions in Section B.

Rather, the City refers only to an Idaho law review article, Spencer

Tiﬂ about

.

of Article VIII Section 3 of the Idaho

in that Section B, the City claims that “...Article VIII, § 3

‘any indebtedness 0r

it “.

Incremental Approach

t0

W. Holm,

What’s the

Improving the Perception, Awareness, and

Eﬂectiveness 0f Urban Renewal in Idaho, 50 Idaho L. Rev. 273, 281 (2014), which articulates
the history of

TIF and explains

how

APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF, PAGE 6

it

works.

In Section

II

0f

this

law review

article, entitled

“The Legality of Urban Renewal and Tax Increment Financing,” the Hart and Yick Kong cases
are reviewed at

pp 284-296. After discussing the Court’s rulings

urban renewal agencies were not

alter

in these cases that, since the

egos 0f the municipalities, the urban renewal agencies

were not constrained from issuing revenue bonds by Article VIII Section
further analysis regarding the

Hart opinion, concludes

Without

3, the author,

as follows:

amended, the Law does not allow a city t0 usurp the
powers and duties of the urban renewal agency. Id at 471, 148 Idaho at 303.

The Court

held:

The holdings

“Even

in Yick

as

Kong and Hart

thus

make

it

clear that the Idaho

Supreme

Court does not think that urban renewal and TIF Violate constitutional restraints

0n

cites’ ability t0 incur

What’s the Tiﬁ’ about TIF?:

t0

Improving the Perception, Awareness, and Eﬂectiveness 0f Urban Renewal
Idaho, 50 Idaho L. Rev. 273, 281 at 284-296 (2014)

in

The

author, like the District Court below, conﬂates authority 0f the municipalities With

of the urban renewal agencies and assumes that the

constitutional constraints in the context 0f implementing

if

An

Incremental Approach

Spencer

that

W. Holm,

indebtedness Without voter approval.

TIF

to

relevant

urban renewal agencies. Clearly,

a municipality adheres to the subject constitutional constraints,

Local Economic Development Act (Idaho Code § 50-2901,

are free of the

cities

it

is

empowered under

et seq.) t0 authorize

a revenue

allocation ﬁnancing provision (“TIF”).

50-2904.

AUTHORITY TO CREATE REVENUE ALLOCATION AREA. An

authorized municipality

is

hereby authorized and empowered to adopt,

at

any

time, a revenue allocation ﬁnancing provision, as described in this chapter, as part

0f an urban renewal plan or competitively disadvantaged border community area
ordinance.

APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF, PAGE 7

the

Such authorization must be
50-2906.

legally binding in the

PUBLIC HEARING

new urban renewal

plan

or

form of an ordinance of the municipality:

AND ORDINANCE REQUIRED.
create

a

competitively

(1)

To adopt

disadvantaged

a

border

community area containing a revenue allocation ﬁnancing provision, the local
governing body 0f an authorized municipality must enact an ordinance in
accordance with chapter

9, title 50,

Idaho Code, and section 50-2008, Idaho Code.

The Local Economic Development Act does not and cannot

free the City

from complying

With the restrictive provisions of Article VIII Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution

promulgated the resolutions providing TIF t0 the

The extent 0f the
ﬁrst interpreted

strictness

by

CCDC

when

it

for the subject urban renewal districts.

0f the constitutional limitations imposed by Article VIII Section 3 as

the Idaho

Supreme Court

in Feil,

was recently analyzed and reafﬁrmed by

the

Court in In the Matter 0f Greater Boise Auditorium District(“GBAD”) v Frazier 59 Idaho 266,

360 P.3d 275 (2015):

While many

states

that Idaho’s is

have a similar constitutional provision,

among

this

Court has held

the strictest, if not the strictest, in the nation. Feil

v.

Coeur
was

d’Alene, 23 Idaho 32, 49, 129 P. 643, 649 (I912).[3] This Court in Feil

from a "liability," the latter being "a
much more sweeping and comprehensive term than the word ‘indebtedness[.]’ "
careful t0 distinguish an "indebtedness"

at 49-50, 129 P. at 649. Though somewhat loosened over time by
amendment, the prohibition against incurring liabilities Without a
vote is still quite strict. See, e.g., Hanson v. Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho 512, 514, 446
P.2d 634, 636 (1968). Feil ‘s analysis 0f the scope 0f Idaho’s constitutional
prohibition that has not been superseded by constitutional amendment[4] remains
good law. See Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 9, 137 P.3d 388, 396 (2006).
Id. at

23 Idaho

constitutional

Greater Boise Auditorium District, 159 Idaho

at

271, 360 P.3d at 280.

***

The relevant analysis for these cases is examining the monetary obligations t0
which the governmental subdivision bound itself. ...... As long as the agreement
does not bind the party t0 a greater liability than it has funds t0 pay for in the
The
ﬁscal year, the characterization of the agreement does not matter:
"any
important matter is, does it create
indebtedness 0r liability in any manner 0r

APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF, PAGE 8

any purpose, exceeding in that year the income and revenue provided for it for
such year"?
We reafﬁrm that principle now. The relevant determination under
Article VIII, section 3 is Whether the governmental subdivision presently bound
itself t0 a liability greater than it has funds t0 pay for in the year in which it bound
itself. Questions about the characterization of the document only matter to the
for

extent that they could provide additional liability.

Greater Boise Auditorium District, 159 Idaho

at

272-273, 360 P.3d

at

281-282.

Turning to the decision in Hart, Which held that revenue allocation bonds issued by the
urban renewal agency did not Violate Section 3 0f Article VIII 0f the Idaho Constitution, the
Court expressly did not address or rule on the constitutionality 0f the City ordinances that

approved urban renewal plans Which incorporate TIF provisions. The Court in Hart was explicit
that

to

its

decision addressed only the authority 0f the urban renewal agency, not the municipality,

approve and issue revenue bonds, as follows:

The

constitutional provisions that Hart argues the

actions

was

by

municipalities.

The only action taken

Act violates are limitations 0n

directly

by

the City in this case

N0. 950, and Hart did not challenge the enactment
in
this
0f
ordinance
a timely manner.[1] Thus, we consider only Whether the
district court erred in conﬁrming the validity of the Agency's resolution approving
the bond purchase agreement and authorizing the issuance of revenue allocation
bonds, the bond purchase agreement, and the bonds that the Agency proposes to
sell to Zions. (Emphasis supplied.)
the passage of Ordinance

(Footnote

1)

Many

Ordinance No. 950.

of Hart's arguments are challenges t0 the City's enactment 0f

We

are not free to reach the merits 0f his challenges t0 the

ordinance.

Hart, 148 Idaho 301, 222 P.3d 469.

While addressing the
and the

sale

validity of the Agency's resolution approving the

of the bonds, the Court expressly declined t0 address

bond agreement

this issue raised

by Appellant

Hart regarding the City’s alleged Violation of the restrictions 0f Article VIII Section 3 by passing
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Ordinance N0. 950 providing TIF t0 the urban renewal agency t0 ﬁnance the Agency’s Plan.

must be pointed out
directly addressed

that this issue,

by

the Idaho

Which was

fully briefed

Supreme Court.

and argued

it

must be likewise acknowledged

that the

never been

The urban renewal industry was deeply

involved in the Hart case, as the Court acknowledged (148 Idaho
therefore

in Hart, has

It

at

303; 222 P.3d 471), and

urban renewal industry

is

0n notice of

this

potential constitutional inﬁrmity, 0r “Achilles Heel,” t0 their business.

Despite the fact that this issue remains unresolved, the large urban renewal industry
continues t0 expand in an apparent effort to

compliance.

Meanwhile, Virtually

all

become too big

t0 reign in t0 constitutional

0f the cases involving TIF and invoking Article VIII

Section 3 have challenged the authority 0f the urban renewal agencies and their function in

regard to the funding issue

that

— not

the municipalities.

This has apparently led t0 the assumption

What the urban renewal agency can do regarding TIF immunizes the City from

constitutional

restrictions

obligations t0 provide

TIF

in

reciprocal

t0 the agency.

0f

its

approving urban renewal plans

Accordingly, in

its

containing

First Decision, the District

concluded and held as follows:

Amended Complaint that the
“revenue allocation funding” in the Shoreline and Gateway Urban Renewal Plans

Here, the Plaintiffs speciﬁcally allege in the

Because the Idaho Supreme
Urban Renewal Agency of Rexburg V.

violates Article VIII §3 of the Idaho Constitution.

Court has directh addressed

this issue in

Hart, and because the Idaho Supreme Court has held that revenue allocation
bonds d0 not violated section 3 of Article VIII of the Idaho Constitution, the
Court ﬁnds the City did not incur indebtedness or liability. Therefore, the Court
GRANTS the Motion t0 Dismiss and DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ claims in the
Amended Complaint that Boise City’s commitment t0 allocate “revenue
allocation funding,” also

CCDC

knowns

as “tax increment financing” (“TIF”) to the

No. 55-18 for the Shoreline District and
Urban Renewal Plan and / 0r Ordinance N0. 58-18 for the Gateway East District
and Urban Renewal Plan Violate Article VIII,§ 3 of the Idaho Constitution.
for twenty years in Ordinance
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its

Court

R. V01

I,

Nowhere

p.

000056.

in the

(Emphasis supplied)

Hart decision was the issue 0f the

constitutional validity 0f the City’s

revenue allocation funding (“TIF”) directly addressed (or even indirectly) other than to expressly
Further, the Court’s ruling in

decline to consider the issue.

issued

by

the

Agency d0 not

Hart

that revenue allocation

bonds

Violate Section 3 0f Article VIII of the Idaho Constitution

is

inapposite and irrelevant to the issue of whether the City incurred indebtedness 0r liability in
Violation 0f that constitutional provision, because the

Agency, unlike the

City,

is

not a

subdivision 0f the state Within the meaning 0f Article VIII Section 3 0f the Idaho Constitution.

Yick Kong, 94 Idaho at 882-883, 499 P.2d at 581-582.

As manifested by

the above

wording

in the holding

0f the

First Decision, the District

Court has erroneously conﬂated the constitutionality of an urban renewal agency’s issuance of
revenue allocation bonds with the issue of Whether the City can constitutionally promulgate a
binding ordinance pursuant t0 Idaho Code §§ 50-2904

— 50-2906,

to provide a long-term

TIF

revenue stream t0 an urban renewal agency in amounts exceeding the municipality’s annual

The

revenue, Without the requisite approval of the qualiﬁed electors.

What an urban renewal agency can constitutionally do with regard
not applicable to municipalities under Article VIII Section

As

ruling in

to revenues

Hart regarding

bonds

is

simply

3.

pointed out in Petitioners’ opening Appeal Brief, despite Petitioners’ arguments 0n

rehearing about the inapplicability of the decision in Hart t0 the merits 0f the instant case, the

District

Court in

constitutional

its

Second Decision continued

law applicable

to

t0

misinterpret

urban renewal agencies and apply
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it

Hart and

t0

conﬂate the

to the City, thus erroneously

avoiding the restrictive provisions 0f Article VIII Section 3 governing tax based municipal

ﬁnancing.

In

its

Second Decision the

District Court criticized

“contract,” etc., used in Petitioners’ briefs

created

by

the passage 0f the Ordinances,

and

oral

argument

Which served

words such

as

“commitment,”

to describe the assumpsit effect

t0 create the obligation

and the

liability

clearly alleged in the detailed complaint 0f Petitioners.

T0 avoid rehashing

Petitioners’ response contained in Petitioners’ Appellants Brief to the

District Court’s said critique, Petitioners will

respond only

t0 the City’s allegation that the City

avoids creating any liability by passage 0f an ordinance granting TIF, because the TIF funds are
disbursed by the County directly to

CCDC:

Boise City does not create a continuing obligation t0 the CCDC, but rather, the
TIF funds g0 directly t0 the TIF district from the County Treasurer, and Boise
City has simply foregone property tax revenues exceeding those attributable t0 the

base value in the TIF

district.

continuing obligation t0 the

CCDC.

set

Therefore, Boise City has not created any

City’s Brief, p.6

The

District

Court in

Second Opinion also found

its

So, the Plaintiffs acknowledge in the
are paid directly

then diverted to

from the County

t0

Amended Complaint

CCDC

0f funds.
p.

TIF revenues
and are never paid to the City and
that the

its decision as to Urban Renewal (Hart)
0n the City’s indebtedness 0r commitment

Therefore, the Court will not reconsider

I,

handling of the TIF funds signiﬁcant:

CCDC.

prohibiting a constitutional challenge

R. V01.

this

000103
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As pointed

out in Petitioners’ opening Appellate brief, the alleged signiﬁcance of this

function 0f the County

is

a “red herring,” since this function

is

part 0f the County’s regular function in assessing, collecting, and disbursing ad

proceeds.

seq.

and

clearly ministerial in nature

valorem tax

Idaho Code § 50-2907; see also County’s function pursuant t0 Idaho Code 63-301,

“Assessment 0f Real Property and Personal Property.” Thus

this function

municipality

making and

is “.

.

controlling the allocation

.empowered

and thereafter modify

it.”

t0 adopt, at

Idaho Code

§

is

further

et

0f the County

derivative of the determinative action of the City in promulgating the subject ordinances.

City’s role in

emphasized by the

is

is

The

fact that the

.”

any time, a revenue allocation ﬁnancing provision.

.

50-2904. The plain language 0f the Act provides that

it

“empowered”

is

the municipality that determines and allocates the tax increment ﬁnancing and

t0

d0 s0 by enacting an ordinance adopting a revenue allocation ﬁnancing provision. Idaho Code

§§ 50—2904

is

— 2906.

THE CITY CREATED AND INCURRED LIABILITY BY PROMULGATING THE SUBJECT
ORDINANCES APPROVING AND PROVIDING FOR TAX INCREMENT FINANCING (“TIF”)
FOR THE SUBJECT URBAN RENEWAL PLANS 0F THE CCDC.
As

discussed in Petitioners’ opening Appellants’ Brief, the ordinances at issue created an

from the agreement

existing, contingent liability arising

TIF for a 20 year period

to the

CCDC

for

its

in the ordinances to provide containing

subject urban renewal plans.

Again,

it

must be

emphasized that any claim that the City’s Ordinances “appropriating” the incremental tax
revenues to the

by
is

the Court in

n0

CCDC
Koch

is

v.

logical difference

somehow

different than the incurring of a debt or liability

Canyon County, 145 Idaho

158, 162-163, 177 P.

between making an appropriation

rejected

3d 372 (2008): “There

that is speciﬁcally prohibited

Constitution and incurring an indebtedness or liability that
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was

is

speciﬁcally prohibited

by

the

by

the

Constitution.”

In Section 4 0f Ordinance

by, incorporated

in,

No. 55-18, the Shoreline

District Plan

was approved

and made a part 0f said ordinance, thereby appropriating the TIF

accordance With Section 502 0f the Plan, “Revenue Allocation Financing Provisions.”
Section 4 0f Ordinance No. 58-18, the
by, incorporated

in,

Gateway East

District

in

In

Urban Renewal Plan was approved

and made a part 0f said ordinance, thereby appropriating the TIF

in

accordance With Section 502 0f the Plan, “Revenue Allocation Financing Provisions.”

Thus,

TIF became and constituted an obligation 0f the City pursuant

to said

said appropriation 0f the

Ordinances.

Any argument

that said Ordinances

0n the City’s budget
anticipated revenues.

certain

is

misleading.

Obviously,

level because

if

d0 not create a

liability

because they have n0 effect

Budgets are developed based on the availability 0f

reasonably anticipated future tax proceeds are capped

at

a

of TIF allocations, the City budget will reﬂect that circumstance.

Moreover, With future tax increments diverted pursuant t0 TIF allocations, the City, being
limited t0 the “base” assessment during the 20 year Plan period, will likely be faced with the

need

to raise taxes to cover the effects

Likewise faulty

is

of inﬂation and other costs that Will inevitably

an argument that n0 obligation exists by the promulgation of an

ordinance allocating anticipated TIF revenue to the

above the base assed value occurs.
for a term

is

arise.

CCDC

Where n0 increase 0f assessed value

A promise to forego anticipated revenue and to allocate same

an enforceable contract. Only

if

it

were known

as a matter 0f fact at the time 0f the

promulgation 0f the ordinance that there would be n0 increment would such an argument hold,
but then that fact would obviate the need and purpose for the ordinance.
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In addition t0 the above referenced review

District as to

What

constitutes an obligation

case, the Court in Greater Boise

particular essence of

(159 Idaho

at

what

by

and an Article VIII Section 3

liability

constitutes “liability” under Article VIII Section 3.

273; 360 P.3d

at

under the Feil

Auditorium District case analyzed in yet greater depth the

282) that a

liability “.

.

implied, or in consequence of torts committed. Feil

649 (1912).”

the Court in Greater Boise Auditorium

The Court reviewed

.may
v.

arise

from

The Court noted

contracts, either express 0r

Coeur d’Alene, 23 Idaho

32, 129 P. 643,

the Feil standard for liability under Article VIII Section 3,

which notably includes being “bound 0r obliged,”

i.e.

an “obligation”:

In Feil this Court also adopted a standard for What constitutes a "liability." Feil,
23 Idaho 32, 50, 129 P. 643, 649. Examining BouVier’s Law Dictionary and its
sources, this Court stated that a liability is a "[r]esp0nsibility; the state 0f one Who

d0 something Which may be enforced by action.
This liability may arise from contracts, either express 0r implied, or in
consequence 0f torts committed. The state 0f being bound or obliged in law or
justice." Id. Adopting this deﬁnition, this Court further distinguished an
indebtedness from a liability. Boise Dev. C0. v. Boise, 26 Idaho 347, 360-61, 143
P. 531, 535 (1914). We used a hypothetical example 0f how a liability can be
This Court found that presently
incurred While indebtedness has not. Id.
obligating oneself to future payments is not a present indebtedness, but it is a
present liability: If A by a valid contract employs B to work for him for the term
0f one year at $50 per month, payable at the end of each and every month, would
this contract not be a liability on A. as soon as executed? A debt of $50 would
accrue thereon at the end of each month, but the liability would be incurred at the
time the contract was entered into. Id. at 26 Idaho at 363, 143 P. at 535.
Accordingly, governmental subdivisions are liable for the aggregate payments due
over the total term 0f a contract rather than merely for what is due the year in
Which the contract was entered. See id. ..... The obligation t0 pay in future years
is

bound

in

law and justice

t0

constituted a liability that the municipal corporation required a super-majority

vote to incur under the Constitution.

was

invalid

and the contract void.

Id.

Id. at

Because it had not done so, the agreement
26 Idaho at 366, 143 P. at 537.

Greater Boise Auditorium District, 159 Idaho
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at

272; 360 P.3d at 28 1.

Hence, by

this analysis,

whereas the obligations created by the passage 0f the subject

Ordinances providing for a stream 0f future revenue to the
indebtedness

beyond the City’s annual revenue

development of the Plan

projects), there

can be

little

CCDC may

(particularly

not constitute current

the

in

early

of the

years

doubt that a present, contingent

liability

was

created t0 provide the “incremental” revenues for 20 years into the future.

The Court

in Greater Boise

Auditorium District commented further on the nature 0f the

Article VIII Section 3 liability:

The framers, while being quite concerned with incurring contingent liabilities,
were not worried about all potential liabilities. The distinction is an important one.
While barring municipalities from incurring contingent liabilities Without a vote
serves the purpose 0f ensuring elected ofﬁcials not bind future ofﬁcials and
taxpayers t0 irresponsible ﬁnancial deals Without citizen approval, barring the
incurring of

all

subdivisions, preventing
vote.

would

potential liabilities

essentially handcuff governmental

them from entering any deal without a super-majority
liabilities that could arise, and it would be

There are uncountable potential

excessively difﬁcult and inefﬁcient, if not outright logically impossible,[7] t0

prove that one

is

overcome

this

vote. Justice

subject t0 absolutely

and
problem 0f potential

similarly

difﬁcult

J.

inefﬁcient

to

n0 potential

require

liabilities.

governmental

Further,

subdivisions

by subjecting every contract
difﬁculty in a 2008 concurrence: It

liabilities

Jones recognized this

Virtual impossibility to present every multi-year

it

is

to

t0 a
is

a

governmental contract or lease to

the public for a vote. Thus, leases and other contracts that are intended to extend

beyond one year always contain provisions

(1)

making

the

government’s

performance subject to availability of appropriated funds and (2) making the
agreement renewable on an annual basis for the contemplated term.
In re Univ. Place/Idaho Water Ctr. Project, 146 Idaho 527, 547, 199 P.3d 102,
122 (2008)

(J.

Jones,

J.,

concurring).

Greater Boise Auditorium District, 159 Idaho
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at

274; 360 P.3d at 283

It

must be equally

clear that the funding 0f urban renewal plans involving

community development and

infrastructure projects, such as

major

were approved by Ordinance Nos.

55-18 and 58-15, are readily distinguishable from the multi-year equipment leases and similar
contracts that are discussed above.

By

Greater Boise Auditorium District,

it is

the standards set forth in Feil and recently reafﬁrmed in

clear that the promulgation of the subject ordinances

the City created a liability in Violation of Article VIII Section 3

20 years Boise City tax revenues

to

CCDC

in cumulative

by appropriating

by

for a period of

amounts exceeding the municipality’s

annual revenue without the requisite approval of the qualiﬁed electors.

IV.

CONCLUSION
When

the City promulgated the subject ordinances containing provisions for revenue

allocation ﬁnancing (“TIF”)

and thereby provided a long-term revenue stream

amounts exceeding the municipality’s annual revenue Without the

to

CCDC

requisite approval

0f the

qualiﬁed electors, the City violated Article VIII, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution.

promulgating

this legal obligation

by and through

said ordinances,

Which

is

in the

in

In

power 0f the

City not only to make, but later to amend, the City created a signiﬁcant, present, contingent,
resulting liability,

which

is

unique to Idaho in

unconstitutionally undertaken

by

breadth and strictness.

That

liability

was

the City, because the City failed t0 ﬁrst obtain the requisite

approval 0f the qualiﬁed electors.

The

District Court’s

misinterpretations 0f the holding in Hart and

case. Accordingly, the

its

fail to

two dispositive decisions below are

address the foregoing central issue of this

Judgment 0f Dismissal entered by the Distract Court should be reversed.
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DATED this 4th day of September, 2020
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
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Attorney for Appellants
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